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Abstract 
Motivated by concerns that a speculative price bubble may have formed in the South African 
house market, this paper examines South African house-price dynamics over a three-decade 
period spanning 1976 to 2005. Estimation of error-correction models reveals that real 
changes in the prices of medium- and large-sized South African homes are associated with 
short-run changes in economic growth, real mortgage rates and sovereign risk. Empirical 
analysis suggests that the real prices of small-sized homes are not associated with real 
mortgage rates in the short run. Estimation of the house-price models also revealed that 
property prices exhibit mean reversion in the long run, although adjustment to long-run 
equilibrium (governed by economic growth, real mortgage rates and sovereign risk) is slow. 
The slow rate of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is partly a function of the presence of 
substantial inertia in house-price changes. These findings are consistent with the consensus 
of housing-market research and the possibility that the South African housing-market may be 
subject to speculative bubbles. However, on the basis that economic fundamentals are 
unlikely to deteriorate substantially in the current economic context, house prices are not 
likely to crash as occurred in the mid 19805. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
It is widely acknowledged that an asset-price bubble had calcified in the South African housing 
market during the early 1980s. Faced by a crumbling economy, unsustainably high prices 
prefaced a 43% collapse in the real value of homes between 1983:Q4 and 1987:Q1. More than 
a decade of anaemic real estate performance followed the mid-1980s housing bust and led into 
the onset of the current boom in 1999:Q3. Between then and 200S:Q4, nominal house prices 
more than trebled, while real house prices grew at an average annual rate of 14 percent. Real 
house prices escalated by a record annual rate of 28 percent in 2004 alone. The size of real 
house-price increases during the current upturn has been striking, while real house prices had 
topped their 1984 peak by 21 percent at end-200S. Further, the duration of the housing boom 
has surpassed that of similar episodes of large real price increases for almost all countries (Nel 
and Mbeleki, 2005). Put together, these factors have raised concerns - which to an extent 
mirror those in international markets - over whether the domestic housing market is subject to 
bubble conditions. These concerns are lent weight when considering that South African buyers 
(generally being na'ive to the boom-bust cycle followed by domestic house prices in the mid-
1980s) are largely unaware of the dangers posed by speculative behaviour. 
However, realization of rapid house-price increases is not in itself prima facie evidence of a 
bubble. The seminal definition of a bubble as proposed by Stiglitz (1990, p. 13) states that: "If 
the reason the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling price will be 
high tomorrow - when 'fundamental' factors do not seem to justify such a price - then a bubble 
exists". With this definition in mind, the key characteristics of an asset bubble are that prices 
have been bid up beyond a level consistent with underlying fundamentals and that buyers of 
the asset have done so with the expectation of future capital gains. In this light, while 
expeditious price increases may represent a necessary condition for identification of a 
speculative price bubble, such increases do not provide sufficient evidence. Instead, rapid price 
increases may be explained by changes in economic fundamentals, which impact on housing 
demand and supply. 
Several fundamentals forces are purported to have precipitated and driven the current boom. 
Broadly, these forces are an outcome of effective macroeconomic policy implementation post-
1994. Government's macroeconomic strategy tabbed GEAR (Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution) was launched in 19961 • The strategy represents a commitment to fiscal 
prudence, conservative monetary policy (under an inflation targeting framework launched in 
1 While the central tenants of GEAR are expected to remain in place, government tabled a new 











2000), as well as the fast tracking of trade- and financial-liberalisation. Apart from developing 
a more propitious environment for economic growth - that had seen economic expansion 
maintain for 25 consecutive quarters as of 2005:Q4 - sound implementation of credible policies 
has strengthened government's fiscal position, lowered inflation and interest rates to 
structurally lower levels, and fortified the economy's external position substantially. In turn, 
combined with relative political stability, the intersection of improved growth prospects, 
sustainable fiscal operations, monetary stability and a strengthened external position; has 
contributed to a significant decline in South Africa's sovereign risk spreads. This development 
was reflected by a series of sovereign credit rating upgrades for South Africa by international 
rating agencies in 2004 and 2005. 
NotWithstanding these positive macroeconomic developments, the magnitude and duration of 
the current boom has led to a sharp decline in the affordability of South African homes. The 
real cost of servicing housing debt has increased sharply, while the house price to disposable 
income ratio (a simple measure used to detect the presence of a house-price bubble) has 
approached levels reached at the peak of the early 1980s boom. This is consistent with the 
international experience where record real house prices have driven the affordability of housing 
(as measured by the house price to income ratio) to historic lows2 • 
The empirically supported consensus in the housing literature dictates that any theoretical 
approach to modelling house-price dynamics must describe a fundamental price to which the 
housing market constantly adjusts (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996). In this regard, 
determinants of real house price changes can be split into two groups. The first group accounts 
for changes in the equilibrium price of a home and can include a broad range of determinants 
that shift housing demand and/or supply. The second group accounts for adjustment dynamics 
and comprises a lagged real appreciation rate (capturing persistence in house-price changes) 
and the difference between the actual and equilibrium real housing values. 
In light of these theoretical underpinnings, as well as recent developments in the South African 
housing market and economy, the objectives of this paper are twofold. First, by developing a 
sound theoretical framework and empirical analYSiS, this paper seeks to bring the fundamental 
forces and adjustment dynamics that drive South African real house-price changes to light. 
This is achieved by estimating an econometric error correction model broadly in line with that 
2 See, for example, The Economist (29 May 2003a) "Property Survey: Castles in Hot Air", The Economist 
(18 June 2005) "The Global Housing Boom - Special Report" or Baker (2002a) "The Run Up in Home 












of Capozza, Hendershott, Mack and Mayer (2002). Second, the paper aims to form an 
assessment of the outlook for the domestic housing market. 
The latter objective does not necessarily demand an explicit determination of whether a price-
bubble has formed in the domestic housing market. Indeed, as noted in the literature review, 
such an exercise is precluded by methodological constraints. Instead, the inclusion of a 
sovereign risk variable (an intrinsically forward-looking indicator) in the house-price equation is 
employed as a primary device for concluding on the domestic housing-market outlook. The 
importance of assessing the outlook for housing is lent credence when considering the severe 
impact of housing busts on the real and financial sectors of economies. According to Bernanke 
and Lown (1991) at least some part of the 1990 recession in the United States of America (US) 
could be attributed to the preceding decline in commercial real estate prices, which weakened 
the capital positions of banks and the balance sheets of corporate borrowers3 . 
The format of this paper is as follows. The literature review of Part II opens by developing a 
theoretical framework for house price dynamics using a standard asset-price model, which 
separates house-price changes into fundamental and non-fundamental components. The 
former of these is discussed using a simple demand and supply framework describing the long-
run equilibrium price of homes. A review of research into housing-market efficiency validates 
the use of adjustment dynamics to describe house-price changes. Finally, Part II concludes 
with a brief review of methodological issues and research related to tests for speculative house-
price bubbles. Part III presents stylised facts on the South African housing market and 
economy over 1976 to 2005. Periods of boom and bust, and the forces that may have driven 
the housing market, are highlighted. Particular emphasis is spent on comparing the current 
boom with the house-price boom of the early 1980s. The exercise provides a useful 
pedagogical device for evaluating the current boom in the greater historical context of the 
domestic housing market. Part IV begins by developing the error correction model estimated. 
Following this, variables include in the model are tested for unit roots and cOintegration. Next, 
results from estimation of the model are presented and discussed. Concluding remarks and 
areas for future research are given in Part V. 
3 See the IMF World Economic Outlook (September 2004) for a full discussion of the real and financial 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT THEORY 
A. House-price dynamics: a theoretical framework 
Following Flood and Hodrick (1990) and Gatzlaff and Tirtiroglu (1995), Cho (1996) employs the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) with a standard asset-pricing model, as a starting point for 
understanding house-price dynamics. The development of the asset-pricing model specified 
below, and the arguments underlying it, is based on that of Cho. Fama (1970) defined a 
market, where prices fully and instantaneously reflect all information, as efficient. Hence, if 
new information arrives randomly, the current price of a home is an unbiased predictor of its 
future value. Assuming a discrete time let the expected rate of return (r) on holding a home 
from time t to time t + 1 be: 
[1] 
where E is an expectation operator, P is the house price and d is the appropriate home rental-
price. In effect, equation [1] states that the expected return, from holding a home for one 
period, is a function of expected capital gain and expected rental income components. Suppose 
Et [rt+l] - p = 0 is a fair game, where p is a constant
4
• Then by substituting equation [1] into 
this identity and rearranging we obtain: 
[2] 
Next, by solving equation [2] forward for n periods and using iterative expectations, it can be 
shown that: 
[3] 
Equation [3] expresses the price of a home as the sum of two components. The first is termed 
the fundamental price, Pt, and represents the long-run equilibrium price. The second is a 
measure of price deviation away from fundamentals, and is termed the non-fundamental price, 
p>ft • 
If (for sufficiently large n) the second bracketed term on the right-hand side of equation [3] 
converges to zero, equation [3] will then give the long-run equilibrium price of a home. In 
this case, the sum of the expected present values of all future rents represents the price of a 
home. Further, under the condition that new information arrives randomly, equation [3] 
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implies in this instance that the housing market will be efficient. In other words, the market 
prices homes using all available information. 
Alternatively, if the second bracketed term in equation [3] does not converge to zero, then 
house prices include a speculative bubble component (given by fP ft ). Under this scenario, the 
current price of a home is not an unbiased predictor of its future value, and the housing market 
is informationally inefficient. Further, it implies that demand for capital gain is present, which is 
in accord with the seminal definition of a bubble as forwarded by Stiglitz (1990, p. 13), which 
states: "If the reason the price is high today is only because investors believe that the selling 
price will be high tomorrow - when "fundamental" factors do not seem to justify such a price -
then a bubble exists". 
8. The long-run equilibrium price of homes and fundamentals 
The standard asset-pricing model detailed by equations [1] to [3] is informative as a device for 
partitioning house prices into equilibrium and speculative bubble components. However, the 
model's practical application is limited, as it requires accurate forecasts of the rental income 
accruing over the life of a home. Hence, housing researchers have turned to other methods for 
determining the long-run equilibrium price of a home in terms of fundamentals. Fundamental 
analysis of house prices is rooted in the supply and demand for housing, and is especially 
useful when gauging long-run equilibrium trends (Tse and Webb, 1999). Employing the model 
proposed by Gallin (2003), housing demand can be expressed as: 
[4] 
where Y is household income; N is the population; W is wealth; UC is the user cost of housing; 
and Bd represents other demand shifters. The user cost of housing is a function of the price of 
homes, P; mortgage rates, m; income and property taxes, Ty and Tp; maintenance and 
depreciation, 0; and expected capital gains, cg: 
UC = P[(l - Ty)(m + Tp) + 0 - cg] = P . A, [5] 
where A represents the bracketed term. Housing supply can be expressed as: 
[6] 
where C is the cost of new construction and Bs represents other supply shifters. Combining 
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P = F(Y, N, W, C, A; ed, e5 ). [7] 
Gallin (2003) continues by stating that a log-linearised solution to the standard fundamentals 
model given by equations [4] to [7] would relate the log of house prices to the logs of all the 
explanatory variables. Further, assuming that unobserved components of the model are 
stationary and that coefficients of the log-linearised solution do not change; house prices and 
explanatory variables that are integrated of the same order will be cOintegrated and share a 
long-run equilibrium relationship, which will depend on the elasticities of demand and supply. 
As regards these elasticities, Meen (1998), in his survey on UK house-price models, suggests 
the following central estimates for the main long-run elasticities: real income (1.7 to 3.0); real 
interest rates (-0.02 to -0.04); number of households (2.0 to 3.0); housing stock (-2.0 to -
3.0). This implies that a 1 percent increase in real income is typically associated with a 1.7 to 
3 percent increase in real UK house prices, while real UK house prices will typically decline by 2 
to 4 percent in response to a 1 percent increase in real interest rates. 
The asset-pricing model given by equations [1] to [3] suggests that house price dynamics may 
not be determined by fundamentals alone. A review of the research into housing market 
efficiency and speculative house-price bubbles illuminates other factors - outside of 
fundamentals - that can be used to model house-price dynamics. 
c. Housing market efficiency 
The predominant theoretical issue explored in housing research is the EMH and the associated 
question of whether housing markets are informationally efficient. Empirical studies on housing 
market efficiency can be delineated into four categories: tests of weak-form efficiency; tests of 
semi-strang-form efficiency; tests of efficiency using market fundamentals; and tests for 
speculative bubbles. According to Fama (1970), strong-form efficiency implies that investors 
cannot consistently earn excess risk-adjusted returns using any publicly or privately held 
information. Semistrong-form efficiency restricts the available information set, Ftr to publicly 
held information. Finally, weak-form efficiency restricts the information set to include only 
publicly held data on past prices and returns. As noted by Cho (1996) the majority of housing 
research into the EMH focuses on testing weak-form or semi-strong form efficiency, and uses 
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where Ut is the mean return on housing, and et is an error term. The error term is assumed to 
be serially uncorrelated and orthogonal to any element of Ft-t the available information set at 
time t. 
Weak-form efficiency is examined by adding lagged returns as independent variables to 
equation [8] and testing the hypothesis that et follows a random-walk process (Cho, 1996). 
Several studies testing weak-form efficiency reject the EMH. Case and Shiller (1989) use 
repeat sales data for homes in Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas and San Francisco and test for 
autocorrelation both in annual changes in real house prices and in after-tax excess housing 
returns. Finding that both house prices and after-tax excess returns are positively 
autocorrelated, they reject weak-form hOUSing-market efficiency. Following the methodology 
used by Case and Shiller (1989), Hosios and Pesando (1991) and Ito and Hirono (1993) reject 
weak-form efficiency in the Toronto and Tokyo housing markets respectively. 
Evidence of positive serial correlation in house-price movements identified by these studies 
confirms that house-price changes in one period tend to be followed in the next period by 
changes in the same direction. As noted by Nakamura and Morita (2002), persistence in the 
direction of house price changes suggests that market participants form na"ive rather than 
rational expectations. In other words, expectations are formed by looking backwards, with 
homebuyers and investors expecting house prices to rise/fall because they have done so in the 
recent past. 
Semistrong-form efficiency is examined through including regressors taken from the available 
information set Ft in equation [8], and then testing the hypothesis that their coefficients equal 
zero. These studies generally use variables representative of market fundamentals in equation 
[8], reject semistrong-form efficiency and include those of Mankiw and Weil (1989), Case and 
Shiller (1990), Clapp and Giacotto (1994) and Meese and Wallace (1993, 1994). 
Mankiw and Weil (1989) identify the importance of demographic forces as determinants of 
housing demand and house prices. Mankiw and Weil report that the entry of the "baby-boom 
generation" into home-buying years was the major driver of aggregate US house prices in the 
1970s. Moreover, Mankiw and Weil claim that since demographic shifts are perfectly 
foreseeable, they should not influence asset prices under the EMH. The findings imply that 
na'ive expectations rather than rational expectations as under the EMH better characterise the 
housing market. 
Case and Shiller (1990) and Clapp and Giacotto (1994) regress changes in house prices on 
income growth, construction costs, tax rates and unemployment rates. These papers both find 











that housing markets are not consistent with the EMH. Similarly, Poterba (1991) finds that 
shifts in income and construction costs have a significant effect on real house prices. Meese 
and Wallace (1993, 1994) add a disequilibrium variable to the standard fundamentals model. 
They find that fundamentals tend to explain house prices in the long run, but short-run 
variations are more difficult to explain using fundamentals. 
The studies reviewed here largely reject the hypothesis of housing markets being 
informationally efficient. In this regard, Cho (1996) finds the general consensus in the 
literature to be that house price changes systematically exhibit positive serial correlation in the 
short run and negative serial correlation (mean reversion) in the long run. Explanations for 
housing-market inefficiency and persistence in house-price changes include: the lack of liquidity 
in housing markets; the infrequency of trade in residential property; high transaction costs; 
and imperfect information since there is no central exchange for housing (Herring and Wachter, 
2002). As noted in The Economist (2003b), the market imperfections described above and 
housing-market inefficiency make house prices particularly prone to bubbles. 
D. Speculative bubbles and house prices 
Discussing house-price bubbles in US housing markets, and following Shiller (2000), Case and 
Shiller (2003) argue that speculative bubbles are caused by "precipitating factors" that have an 
immediate impact on demand, and by an "amplification mechanism" that takes the form of 
price-to-price feedback. Case and Shiller propose that this "amplification mechanism" is 
generally generated through optimistic word-of-mouth that leads homeowners and buyers to 
anticipate further capital gains. In effect, bubbles are formed by accelerated price increases 
(precipitated by positive fundamental developments), which generate price-to-price feedback 
(as evidenced by positive serial correlation in the short run) and amplify house-price changes 
to levels inconsistent with fundamentals. 
Although dramatic house price boom-to-bust cycles that have occurred in several international 
markets imply house-price bubbles are an empirically observed reality, few researchers have 
explicitly tested for the presence of bubbles in housing markets. This reflects the fact that the 
application of econometric modelling - as a means of testing for asset-price bubbles - is 
synonymous with methodological concerns5 . Most importantly, researchers' efforts to 
distinguish between fundamentals-driven house-price changes and bubbles are hamstrung 
since it is impossible to know the "true" fundamental model (Flood and Hodrick, 1990). 
5 Flood and Hodrick (1990) provide a review of methodological issues and complications related to asset-











Consequently, econometric results pointing toward the existence of a bubble could be an 
outcome of model misrepresentation. 
Abraham and Hendershott (1996) disregard this concern, however, on the basis that housing 
researchers have strong priors on what house-price fundamentals should include. Testing for 
bubbles in US metropolitan housing markets they (Abraham and Hendershott, 1996) elaborate 
on the standard asset pricing model given by equations [1] - [3]. They (Abraham and 
Hendershott, 1996) model house prices changes as being determined by fundamentals (i.e. real 
income per capita, employment, real interest rates and construction costs), as well as a bubble 
builder term (caused by the expectation of capital gains) and a bubble burster term (which 
captures the tendency for the bubble to eventually burst owing to actual house prices diverging 
from equilibrium prices). Results of their empirical estimation showed that the bubble variables 
were significant and, together with changes in market fundamentals, accounted for around 60 
percent of house-price fluctuations. Following a similar methodology to Abraham and 
Hendershott (1996), Kalra, Mihaljek and Duenwald (2000) tested for evidence of speculative 
bubbles in the Hong Kong property market. They (Kalra, Mihaljek and Duenwald, 2000) found 
that market fundamentals together with adjustment dynamics (as captured by the bubble 











III . HO USE PRICES AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY: STYLISED FACTS 
Smoothed qll ~ rtc rly series of nominal and rea l average prices ror a'i sizcs of homcs are 
depicted in Figure 1", Smoothed qu~rtcrly scrics of real "verage prices for small-, medium. 
and iarge-sized homes are ,hown in Figure 2. Smoothed quarter 'y scrics of nornin~1 and rea l 
" vcr~ge prices for ~ fford.!lble ~ nd luxu ry home, are depicted in Figure 3 and Figurc 4 
re'pectively. Over the three--(iecade period sponning 1976:Ql to l005:Q4, two dist inct house-
price cydcs c~ n be dist!~guished: the boom to b • .Js!: cycle of the early 1980s and thc cllrre~t up 
cycle , These two cycles, and the attendant scts of eCO'1omic circumst~nces, are rev iewed "1 
turn be low. An oiys'!s highlights that while both housir>:j booms sharcd one fe~ture of price 
namely exped,tious price Incrm ses the macroeC0'10m lC circumstances 
ilccomp"ny!ng the two periods are widely divcrgen t. For e~se of exposit ion, a~a lysi s ,efers to 
the priccs 01 medium-sized hO!T)f's for the rem~inder of Patt 1Il of this paper (un less otherwise 
indicated). 
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A. Cycle I: The e~rly 1980s house-price boom to bust cycle 
Aft~ r ~ downturn th~l foilowed the politic~ 1 unrest 01 the mid 1970s (Figure 6), real house 
prrces w()rned during 1980;Q1 to 1982:Q3 . Ov~ r this p~riod, r~o l y~ ~r-()n-ye~r qu ~ rterly 
house-price growth averaged 12,9 percent (Fig<lre 5)_ Record """"nal in<:reas~s in h ()us ~ 
prices were Gbserved during this period, w',th a pe~k year-on-ye~r qu~rt~ rly r~ te of 40 percent 
set in 1981:Q2 (Fig<lre 7) Tile OJerent housi ng worn and boom Gf th e ear ly 1980s are th ~ 
only st"Qes withi n th e 5~mple period where nominal 11D<Js.e-pr ice growth has exceeded 
conS<lmer price inflati()n f ()r a sustained lenQth of tirn ~ (Fi g ur~ 7), R~ " I 'I ~ "r-on-ymr qu~rte r ly 
house price growth bnefly t<lrned negat ive in 19B2'Q4, before recovering to averaQ ~ 5.5 
pe rcent dUring 1983, H ()wev~ r. a<te r a r~ vers~ 1 of th ~ ~[onomic conditions that prec ipitated 
the boom, this led into a 11 D<JSing-market collapse_ Tile severity of the c()lIapse was such that 
the ~ ",p"ical anamoly of nomin~1 house-pr'ice dedines was obser-Jed ' _ From a record Iligll of R 
476 150 in til e l i rst q<larter GI 1984, rea l h()use prices (()llap""d to R 269 017 by the 
corr~ sponding q m rter c/ 1987, 
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3rJdlcy Hutchings S'JUtll Mricor, Iiouse-Price Dyn","t' 20G7 
Tll ~ Qns~t of th~ early 1980s boom was accompanied by robust perfor"", nce for the domestic 
economy. Fuelled by th~ gold-pric~ boom ( Figure 6). real GDP growtll averaged 5.6 percent 
pe r annum ill 1980 and 1981 ( Figure 5). whil ~ hous~ h olds ~njoy~ d strong gail1S ill disposable 
income and empoymel1 t levels. Further irnpetu s to a boominQ ~ co nomy ~nd hous~ prices was 
provid€d by n ~ Q~tiv ~ r~ ~1 Interest ra tes, which were served up by lax rnonetary policy tJ",tw~~ n 
1'179 'Q 1 and 1'18LQ2 (Figur~ 8J . Hou,;."holds borrow~d heavily to finance ho<J«ng purellaseS 
(FIQur~ 9). l ~ adinQ to a rapid increase ill the ratio of household d ~ bt to h ous~ hold inc-ome 
(Figure 10) COl1 sequently, at th~ on,;."t of th~ housing market collap se to follow, househo ld 





, "'------''''---- -~ 
"" " " ,." ,... ~"' "" "'" "" _ ..... """' .. ,._.,.,.. __ "'~",,, ... ,,n.,,. 
," " "" .... "" .m "" ,,.,, " " 





"" "., "" "" .... .... "" ,,,, 
__ '>-_ d_ ta ",,,,._Inoo ... ,,, "" ....... "'" 






'" "-~~'--'-"''---':'--'C--:",_~..II; ~ ."
,.,. ".. ~"' ".. "" "" '"'" "" 
Regu lato ry d ev~lopme nts also impacted on house price, in th ~ ~ arly 1980s, As noted by Martin 
(1989). th e housJnQ m~rk~ t ..... ~ s su pported by government provision of inc~ n t iv~ s o"signed to 
prornot~ hom~ ownership. I\ron, ML>ellbauer a nd Srnit (2004) hiQhl,ght t r", !'rn st quantitati vely 
The "'''pirie. ' irregul",;:;, of nominal hou"'-price dot l,,,,,, ie, di,cussM by K,"in~r, J. (200J) "House Price 
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important of these as being: tax benefits on deposits at building societies; tax benefits to 
employers who provide housing to employees; and housing fringe benefits (in the form housing 
cost subsidies provided to many private sector and government sector employees) not treated 
as taxable income. 
The latter stages of the early 1980s house-price boom coincided with a sharp deterioration in 
previously accommodative economic conditions. Prompted by the Reserve Bank, interest rates 
began to climb in 1981:Q1, so as to prevent the economy from over-heating. As the price of 
gold slumped, growth rates of real GDP and household disposable income turned negative, 
while unemployment rose. In an endeavour to support a rand that was flailing towards the end 
of the hOUSing-boom period on the back of severe balance of payments distress, interest rates 
were hiked further. Interest rates peaked at 21.5 percent in 1985:Q2, lifting the real cost of 
servicing housing debt to record levels (Figure 11). Combined with macroeconomic instability, 
political pressure from both domestic and foreign sources contributed to a significant widening 
of sovereign risk spreads, and culminated in economic sanctions being imposed by the 
international community in 1986. 
Consequently, with real house price growth continuing and economic fundamentals worsening 
in 1983 and 1984, it is likely that house prices departed from their long-run equilibrium value, 
with house-price growth being driven by demand for future capital gains. Two pieces of 
evidence support the conjecture that a price bubble had calcified in the housing market during 
the early 1980s. Figure 11 reveals that the house price to disposable income per capita ratio 
reached record levels in late 1984, suggesting a departure of house prices from long-run 
equilibrium valueS. Further, as shown in Figure 12, the average price of new homes had fallen 
below their replacement cost, suggesting that the housing market was due a downward 
correction (ABSA, 2004). 
Following the housing market collapse, average real house price growth approached a negative 
percent per annum through 1988:Q1 to 1999:Q1. During this period, macroeconomic 
performance was poor, and characterised by intermittent periods of recession, high and volatile 
inflation and interest rates, as well as political uncertainty. Further pressure on house prices 
stemmed from the exodus of skilled professionals during most of the 1990s (Luus, 2005). On 
the back of moderately good economic growth, an improved fiscal position, lower inflation and 
interest rates, as well as an easing of fears regarding South Africa's political situation, robust 
8 The house price to income ratio is widely used as simple non-parametric measure for detecting house-
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real house price growth returned in 1997:Q4. Financial liberalisation and a softening rand, 
which attracted foreign buyers towards South African property, aided the recovery. The 
impact of foreigners on domestic house prices was felt strongest in the tourist-friendly Western 
Cape region, where quarterly, year-on-year nominal growth averaged 24 percent from 1997:Q4 
to 1998:Q3. However, contagion effects from the Asian crisis led to a sharp fall in the rand and 
a spike in interest rates, which sent house-price growth back to sub-inflation levels, leading 
into the current housing up-cycle. 
B. Cycle II: Economic reform and the current housing boom 
Because housing market performance was weak during the twelve years succeeding the mid-
1980s crash, real house prices came off a low base at the onset of the current boom in 
1999:Q3. Since then, average nominal house prices have more than tripled, lifting from 
R210,389 in 1999:Q3 to R706,002 by 2005:Q4, while real year-on-year quarterly house-price 
growth averaged 13.8 percent. Nominal year-on-year quarterly house-price growth 
approached 32 percent in 2004:Q4, the fastest rate achieved since 1981 :Q3. By 2005:Q4, real 
house prices exceeded the 1984:Q4 peak by 21 percent. 
Between 1999:Q3 and 2005:Q4, house prices benefited from significantly improved 
macroeconomic conditions. Real GDP growth lifted to an average annual rate of 4 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, after average less than 2% in the 1990s. Robust economic growth 
performance has supported strong gains in household disposable income growth. Improved 
economic performance has been built on a platform of prudent macroeconomic policies. A 
conservative fiscal stance has lowered government deficits and debt to favourable levels. 
Combined with effective implementation of monetary policy (guided by an inflation-targeting 
framework adopted in February 2000), fiscal prudence has helped reduce inflation and interest 
rates to structurally lower and stable levels. 
Having averaged over 10% during the first half of the 1990s, consumer price index (CPI) 
inflation has steadily declined, with an annual rate of 3.3% recorded in 2005. Consumer price 
index excluding mortgage costs (CPIX) inflation - the Reserve Bank's targeted measure -
remained within the 3-6 percent target range for 28 consecutive months to December 2005, 
and generally trended below the midpoint of the range since mid-2004. By anchoring inflation 
expectations, credibility of monetary policy has reduced the economy's vulnerability to adverse 
external shocks. Disinflation under inflation targeting enabled a 650 basis point cut in the repo 
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December 2005. Bank lending rates followed suit, allowing households to borrow heavily in 
order to finance consumption and real estate purchases. As a result, although households' 
balance sheets initially improved during the early phases of the current housing boom, the ratio 
of household debt to disposable income reached record levels by end-2005. 
According to ABSA (2004) housing market demand has also received a boost from demographic 
forces. These are: a rapidly growing black middle-class, a steady increase in the number of 
households over the years, and a strong foreign interest in domestic property. Moreover, ABSA 
(2004) posits that shifting demographics have heightened the scarcity of suitable and properly 
serviced land, in close proximity to central business districts - adding to a supply constraint. 
On the regulatory front, ABSA (2004) reports that annual reductions in property transfer duties 
- since February 2001 - have helped sustain house price growth. The cost of buying homes 
was further reduced in March 2004 through the abolition of the mortgage bond stamp duty. 
Housing subsidies for low-income householders are providing added impetus to the housing 
market. Once allowed into the property market, low-income households can sell their 
subsidised homes and upgrade. The improved investment status of property relative to other 
asset classes has also supported by the residential property boom (Nel and Mbeleki, 2005). 
Between 2001 and 2004, the percentage of homebuyers that are investors rose from 5 percent 
to 10 percent9 • 
Despite favourable macroeconomic and regulatory conditions, the affordability of housing 
deteriorated sharply during the second half of the current house-price boom. Average quarterly 
mortgage repayments on homes have lifted to 1985:Q1 levels, while the house price to income 
ratio has approached levels recorded prior to the mid-1980s crash. Further, on the back of 
rapid increases, the ratio of mortgage instalments to rental income began steadily increasing in 
2004 (Nel and Mbeleki, 2005); hence, reducing the attractiveness of residential property as an 
investment vehicle. As a result, by rendering residential property increasingly unaffordable, 
expeditious price increases have dampened consumption demand for housing, while also 
weakening investment demand owing to the divergence of prices from yields. Consequently, 
the rate of house-price growth began to moderate in 2004:Q4 and, by end-2005, annual house 
price growth had slowed for fourteen consecutive quarters. Despite this slowdown, the prices 
of new and existing homes rapidly converged in 2004 and 2005, suggesting that house prices 
may be due a correction. 
9 Source: Standard Bank. Investors are distinguished from owner-occupiers on the basis that they own 
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IV. MODELLING SOUTH AFRICAN HOUSE PRICES 
A. An error-correction model of house prices 
Following Capozza, Hendershott, Mack and Mayer (2002), it is assumed that there is a long-run 
equilibrium price for homes, P', in each time period, t, that is determined by macroeconomic 
conditions, X, such that: 
[9] 
where P' is the log of the real fundamental value of housing and Xt is a vector of exogenous 
explanatory variables. Using an error correction framework, it is assumed that changes in the 
real price of homes are determined by reversion to their long-run equilibrium value, short-run 
changes in macroeconomic conditions, as well as serial correlation according to the following 
relation: 
[10] 
where Pt is the log of real house prices (at time t) and"" is a difference operator. The first term 
on the right-hand side of equation [10] describes reversion to long-run equilibrium and a (-1 < 
a < 1) measures the rate of adjustment to equilibrium. The second term on the right-hand side 
of equation [10] captures short-run real house prices movements in response to changes in 
economic conditions. The third term on the right-hand side of equation [10] is the serial 
correlation term, where y is the serial correlation coefficient. 
The exogenous explanatory variables investigated (for both the long-run equilibrium solution 
and short-run changes in economic conditions) are: 
Xi = {RGOP; RISK; RMRATE} [11] 
where the variables in equation [11] are the log of real GOP, sovereign risk, and the real 
predominant rate on mortgage advances. The limited number of variables investigated reflects 
a desire to develop a parsimonious representation of house prices, while the selection of the 
variables used is based on their theoretical appeal. 
The coefficient of the real GOP (income) variable is expected to be positive since greater 
income levels are likely to raise housing demand and hence exert upward pressure on prices. 












to track per capita income growth in the long run. First, if land zoned for new construction is 
fixed while individuals allocate a certain fraction of their incomes for housing; then with fixed 
supply, the price of that fixed land should increase with income. Secondly, construction costs 
(which mostly comprise labor costs and form a substantial component of new house prices) 
tend to track per capita income as well; hence house prices and income levels should track 
each other. House prices studies generally utilise a per household income measure and not an 
aggregate measure of income. However, following the IMF (2005), the latter is used in this 
paper because it captures two effects simultaneously: (i) the increase in average household 
income; and (ii) the rise in the number of households, which is pertinent to South Africa given 
prevailing demographic trends and, in particular, the emergence of the black middle class. 
The coefficient of the real mortgage rate variable is expected to be negative, owing to higher 
financing costs dampening demand and lowering pressure on prices lO . The inclusion of real 
mortgage rates can also be motivated in terms of the asset-pricing model given by equations 
[1] to [3] since, as noted by Abraham and Hendershott (1996), the conversion of a future 
stream of rents into a value introduces the real interest rate as a determinant of real house 
prices. 
The inclusion of a sovereign risk variable is relatively unique within the housing literature but is 
motivated on several groundsll . Sovereign risk can be used as a proxy measure for a broad 
range of determinants including: political stability; economic growth prospects; the credibility 
and efficacy of macroeconomic policies and, as such, the sustainability of a sovereign's fiscal 
position and the stability of its monetary environment; and, finally, the strength of a 
sovereign's external position. Hence, combined with the real GDP variable, the sovereign risk 
variable allows the model to capture the effect of economic growth, as well as the sustainability 
of economic growth and macroeconomic conditions during a given time period. 
B. Data properties 
Quarterly time-series data spanning 1975:Q1 to 2005:Q4 has been collected for the analysis. 
South African house-price data is sourced from Absa bank's Residential Property Market 
Database (RPMD). The RPMD is widely acknowledged as the authoritative source of South 
African housing data 12 . House prices are examined on a disaggregated basis in this paper. In 
10 See Harris (1989) for a full discussion of the impact of real interest rates on house prices. 
11 Barr and Kantor (2002) include a political risk variable in an equation for South African house prices. 
12 For a full discussion of the process used to compile the RPMD see "The ABSA Residential Property Market 
Database for South Africa: Key Data Trends and Implications" (Luus, 2005), taken from "Real Estate 
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this regard, the model given by equations [9] to [11] is estimated for five different house-price 
series, namely: 
i. The prices of small-sized homes (80m2-140m2 in size); 
ii. The prices of medium-sized homes (141m 2-220m 2 in size); 
iii. The prices of large-sized homes (221m2-400m2 in size); 
iv. The prices of affordable homes (40m2-80m2 in size and less than RI00,000 in 
value in constant 2002 prices); 
v. The prices of lUxury homes (properties with a value in excess of Rl,SOO,OOO in 
constant 2002 prices). 
The use of disaggregated house-price data in this paper is motivated on two grounds. First, it 
represents an attempt to account for the wide socio-economic disparities prevalent in South 
Africa (and the attendant distinctions in house-price dynamics across different hOUSing-market 
segments). Second, the use of disaggregated house-price data is motivated by the need to 
account for differing house-price dynamics across different sizes of homes during periods of 
boom and bust. A review of Figure 2 reveals that house prices increased more for large- than 
medium-sized homes during housing boom periods, while the prices of small sized-homes have 
tended to decrease relative to medium sized-homes during boom periods and vice-versa. In 
reviewing size trends in South African homes, LuLis (2003) interprets this trend as suggesting 
that homeowners tend to "downscale" during periods when the property market was under 
pressure and "upscale" during housing-boom periods. 
All the house-price series are smoothed by ABSA so as to exclude the distorting effect of 
outliers in the data. The nominal house-price series have been converted into real terms 
(constant 2000 prices) using the consumer price index (CPI) for metropolitan and other urban 
areas published by Statistics South Africa. This conversion differs from other studies, which 
utilise the consumer price index excluding mortgage costs (CPIX)13. However, the CPIX series 
has only been published since 1997, and hence, its use is precluded from this analysis. 
Descriptions and basic summary data for the five house-prices series examined in this paper 
are shown in Table 1. 











LOg ('l.>lP S) 
Lng (R,IiP H) 
L"'O :RHP AFF) 
L09 (RIiP llJ)() 
" 
. . "~,~~,,~-,,",,, ~-~~ ... " ...,.-,:,. ~" .... ~- .~ ... 
'" , __ ' .•• ' <.' •• ' ,'. • . .. " " ."10 
Log of price of =. II ·~iz~~ l'IOm~! ~rfl.t~d by (PI 
(mel,opol,t.n ond othN ur~JI' ~r~a!) 
LO<! of price of me<li um'S;'~d ~"m~s ""nated by 
[PI f "",tropo l, t..m ~nd oth .... ,,,ban ", ... ,) 
La" of P"'~ u, I.'ge-ii%<'\i ~nmt5 (IIi'Ii!~ by (PI 
(mrlro~ t"n .nd OUl<'l' U'''''' iUN~) 
LoO) of P"'~ "I ~llt>rd~bl" n,,~ rlrnatr.<! ~V CPI 
:m~lJ"opci ,t.n and oth ... u • .,.n Jf~~) 
LOQ ofpnc<! 01 lu""y h um ....... ~~! ..,. bv (PI 
<_t.""""tan.....;l oth~r .... t)3n "'NO) 
_." Std. D<! .. IU,on 
11.34 0.2428 
12 Sq o 21,) 
12 q6 0.2277 
JI.34 0,1]66 
' •. _2 O.lZSS 
Tile re~ 1 GDP series (5C~500~lIy JdJusted at constant 2000 pntcs) IS wClrccd from tee So~th 
Afr ican Rese"le B~nk . Tile '-N I GDP ~nd house pnce ser ies ~ave been converted into 
Icganthmic fo,n, ~nd t(~rtSformed into year-or'l-Yt: ~r growth r~t.,,; USing the (On(lnOOU$ly 
comflQun{j,"9 g."'O'W tll ,Me formul~, rhc ;a>.'erelgn ris k S"ries is ca lClllal ed as tile (I,lrc;cllce in 
y,eld between long- term South Afrlt:'<ln &,,(1 US gO'I/emm"nl bonds_ Th" ,eleva"" series &~ 
sourtt'Ci from !nlernimonal fLn,mdal Slatistocs, The predominant ",I" on mOlToaOeS S""es is 
sourced fron> t he South African ReSCN" Bank. SubtracUr>g th" year-on-Yt:ar t:hdI'\9C III t ho:: 
coo""mer price lode">" senes f[tlm the mO<tlililoe rate SImes generaa.s the <'eiI1 mortgage ."te 
senes Oes<:nllOQl'1s <lnd baSIC summary data for the e~O<)eflolL Y<lrlabtes used In estimating 
equations (9] to [11] ace shown Table ~ . 
v.rl.ble o..o<ription of v~d.l>le Mean StG. O."laU .... 
~Oq (~(>OP) 
1"9 of ",~I GDP iO">nSl:.'nl 2·100 P"('!'S. SN""M lly nS9 n "82 
~dJusb'd 01 an annu"ustd ralt) 
.,," Spread belween lonq- tNm s~,~n WI1can dnd US 6010 3.4):7 g.ovt'wm""'t b<>nd~ 
~MR.n: 
Pr"<lomln4nl , .t~ un morI9Jg<' ~dvan~ IOO I ....... 0,061 0,0455 
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root tests on tt'e d~t . series, ~ DPropn~te I~g lengths h~ve been chosen using the Schwartz 
Information Criterion. A tr""d term has only ~een included in the test if significant_ Table 3 
reports the Augrnented Dickey-Full"," unit root results for the relev~nt v~,,~blcs. Results 01 unit 
root testing reveal tt, ~ t [)One cl tt'e ~~ri ~ ble5 M C st~ tion~ry in levels. However, ye~ r-on-ye~ r 
growth rates and changes for all the variables are stationary; h""ce the variables are all 
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S~'.Jth Arnon House-Price Dym"'ics <00/ 
Since th~ vari~bles employ~d in th~ error-correction models are all integrated of th~ :;~,nc 
order it is posSlble to proceed with te:;ting for cointegration (I.e. to ex~mine whether the 
r~sp"ctlve hoose-price series and RGDP, RISK ard R~'RATE Me cointegrated in a lono-run 
equir,bnurn r~lationship). T~sting for co<nt~Qr~tion is performed in [VIEWS employing the 
methodaklgy developed in JoI1an:;en. In applying the te:;ts, it is ~""umed th~t the level d~t~ 
h~ ve no deterministic trends and the co<ntegrating equ~tions have intercepts, Results Irom 
colnt"'lratlon te5tinQ are displayed in T~bl~ 3 ~rd confirm th~t the sm~II-, medium· , ""d I~rge­
sized muse-price series ~re co<nLegrated with the RGDP, RISK and MRATE series in long-run 
equilibrium rel~tionshlps. The r.ause-p,,[~ ,Nies for ~fford~ble ~nd luxury homes are mt, 
however, cQintegrated with the exogenous variable:; examined, henc~, these :;e"es dre 
proo'jded from estim~tian in the error-correction model. 
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D. Error-correction models estimation and results 
For the sample period spanning 1980:Ql (coinciding with tile onset of th e 19<;05 boom) and 
2005:Q4, th e model given by equations 19] to rill is ~ sti""'ted using EVIEW5 in two stages for 
each of the applicabl ~ hous~ -pric~ series. In the first staQe, equation [91 is estimated "5<1,," 
Ordi"",), Least Squarf>S to determine th ~ loog run equilibrium price 01 homes. Esti"",tloo 
resliits ror the sm~II', medium·, large-Sized house-pric~ long run equations are presented in 
Table 5, Table 6 ~nd T~ble 7 respectively. For each of the eqllatloos, Pdr.mctcr coefficients 01 
the explanatory variables are of the eXD"cted 5ign and are highly significant, Furth ~ r, th e 
resd"~ls taken fmm the e5tirnilted .-quations are ~II ;t~tiorM.l', 
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O" p" nd" nt variable: Log :RHP LJ 
~-
hplanalory vari~ble Coeffici",,1 std. ~rror t-Statlstic Prob. 
LOG (RGDPJ 0.9849,0 0.0014}6 ·1Q.1.3o'4 0.0000 
RISK -1.110934 0_387~4~ -·3.610663 0.0004 
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The r~sdu~ls (ERROR_5, ERROR M, ERROR L) tak~ n from ~sbm~bon of the long run-
equilib,ium r~l~tions ~r~ ~" ch I~gqed by on~ period "nd included in equa tion [10]. which is then 
estim~t~d LJsing Ordinary Least 5Quar~s. Estimation r~ sults for th~ sm"II-, medium- and large-
,iled hous~-price error-corr~ction mod~ls are presented in nble 8, Table 9 and T~ble 10 
respectively. Th ~ r~siduals t~k~ n from the e5tim~ted ~qLJations ore stationMy, as illust rat~d in 
figure 13, FigLJre 14 arxl Figure 15, which plot ~ctu~ l, fitted, "nd residual valL>es for the small 
medium- and lar~e-5il~d hOLJse price equations respectively. 
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D~pend~nt v~ri~bl .. : I Log (RHP_H) 
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Combining the resu lts rrom :he two-stagE estimation procedure Y'E ld, the foilowinQ ",l oti ons for 
the (inal Error corrECion modEls: 
lILog(RHP M) 
-O,053S*lO.940G*LOG(RGDP) L 1761 -RISK 
LOG(RHP 5( · 1))] + O,2561'lILOG(RGDP.(2)) 
° 87%*t.LOG(RHP_S( 1)), 
-0. 0535~[ 0 _ 9593~LOG( RGDP) 0.0616 'RISK 
LOG(RHP_M (-l))J + 0,2017*t.LOG(RG])P, (1)) 














~: ) ! 
= -0.0369*[0.9849*LOG(RGDP) 1.4109*RISK - 0.0536*RMRATE -
LOG(RHP _L(-l))] + 0.2202*LlLOG(RGDP, (1)) - 0.0065*LlRISK(-1) -
0.1757*LlMRATE( -2) + 0.8935*LlLOG(RHP _L( -1)). 
Each of the estimated models performs is highly successful in explaining variations in South 
African house-price changes. The exogenous variables explain around 92% of the variation in 
small-sized home price changes, 93% of the variation in medium-sized home price changes and 
94% of the variation in large-sized home price changes. 
The parameter coefficients of the RGDP series are significant in the long and short run and of 
the expected sign for the three house-price models. Accordingly, real changes in the prices of 
homes are contemporaneously positively related to real GDP growth. Further, in view of the 
aggregated measure of income employed in testing, it could be inferred that rising numbers of 
households in South Africa (and the emergence of the black middle class) has supported house 
prices during the current housing boom. 
For all the models, the parameter coefficients of the RMRATE series are of the expected sign. 
In addition, the parameter coefficients were significant (albeit less so in the RHP _L model) for 
the both the RHP _M and RHP _L models. The short-run RMRATE parameter coefficient was not, 
however, significant in the RHP _S model. This finding possibly stems from the fact that lower 
segments of the housing market (including first-time buyers) have limited access to housing 
finance, irrespective of short-run movements in interest rates. In the short run, the parameter 
coefficient of the RMRATE series is higher in the RHP _M model than in the RHP _L model. Since 
the review period has been characterised by large swings in the RMRATE series (relative to the 
RGDP series for which the short-run parameter coefficient is marginally higher in the RHP_L 
model), this result would appear to be in discord with the notion - as suggested by Luus (2003) 
- that householders "upscale" during boom periods and "downscale" during periods when the 
housing market is under pressure. However, owing to the fact that buyers of large-sized 
homes will in many instances require less financing to purchase homes (owing to greater 
personal wealth), buyers in the upper segment of the housing market are likely to be less 
sensitive to short-run changes in interest rates when making home buying decisions. 
The parameter coefficients of the RISK series are Significant in the long and short run and of 
the expected sign for all three house-price models. In view of the motivation underpinning the 
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house-price changes are not only influenced by favourable macroeconomic conditions, but also 
the sustainabi/ity of favourable fundamentals. 
For all the models, the short-run parameter coefficients enter the models at a lag or lead of two 
periods at most. This finding suggests relatively quick pass-through from the exogenous 
variables to property prices. 
The parameter coefficient of the error correction term is negative and significant for all the 
models (although only very weakly significant for the RHP _L model). This finding is consistent 
with the housing-literature consensus that house prices exhibit mean reversion in the long run. 
The relatively small parameter terms on the error coefficients suggest that adjustment to 
housing-market equilibrium is slow. 
For each of the models, changes in real house prices are highly autocorrelated. This result is in 
accordance with the consensus in the literature that housing markets are not informationally 
efficient. In addition, the high level of persistence in short-run house-price dynamics partially 
explains the slow rate of housing-market adjustment towards long-run equilibrium. Further, the 
evidenced inertia in house-price changes suggests that there is potential for South African 
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v. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has examined South African house-price dynamics over a three-decade period 
spanning 1976 to 2005. Estimation of error-correction models for a sample period spanning 
1980:Q1 to 200S:Q4 revealed that real changes in the prices of medium- and large-sized South 
African homes are associated with short-run changes in economic growth, real mortgage rates 
and sovereign risk. Empirical analysis suggested that the real prices of small-sized homes are 
not associated with real mortgage rates in the short run. Estimation of the house-price models 
also revealed that house-prices exhibit mean reversion in the long run, although adjustment to 
long-run equilibrium (governed by economic growth, real mortgage rates and sovereign risk) is 
slow. The slow rate of adjustment to long-run equilibrium is partly a function of the presence 
of substantial inertia in house-price changes. This finding is consistent with the possibility that 
the South African housing-market may be subject to speculative bubbles. 
This possibility is lent credence when considering the dramatic boom-to-bust cycle followed by 
house prices in the mid-1980s. In evaluating the present position of the housing market, 
however, due consideration must be taken of the fact that economic conditions are widely 
divergent from those experienced in the mid-1980s, when a sharp deterioration in 
fundamentals led into a housing market crash. With the establishment of credible monetary 
and fiscal policy frameworks (which together with improved economic growth prospects and a 
substantially strengthened external position have helped narrow South Africa's sovereign risk 
spreads substantially), interest rates in South Africa are likely to remain at structurally lower 
levels in a context of reasonable growth performance for at least the medium term. In this 
light, while favourable fundamentals have supported the recent boom in house prices, they are 
expected to support house prices in the near term. This contention is supported by house-price 
developments post-200S, which suggest that the housing market is set for a "soft-landing". 
Risks to the housing-market outlook are, however, apparent. A key risk derives from the 
strong presence of buy-to-Iet investors in the current market, which provide the market with 
momentum and can fuel house-price growth trends, since investors are more likely than 
homeowner-occupants to buy/sell properties when they expect or see a rise/drop in property 
prices (Mbeleki and Nel, 2005). Hence, a simultaneous selling-off by investors to avoid or limit 
capital losses can exacerbate a potential decline in house prices. A more robust examination of 
this topic represents a possible area for future research, whereby the housing market would be 
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